Academic discussions about the political (under-)representation of women tend to focus on descriptive or substantive representation -that is, the numbers of women present in politics or the representation of so-called 'women's interests' in politics. As such, arguments in favour of increases in women's representation tend to invoke either or both of these ideas. there are arguments that focus on substantive political outcomes as a result of any increase in the number of women in political institutions, and those that do not.
theoretical out of necessity thanks to the small numbers of women who were elected to legislatures worldwide. More recently, though, this theoretical literature has been supplemented by an empirical literature assessing what the impact of the welcome and overdue increase in the numbers of women in politics has actually been (Vega and Firestone 1995; Childs 2004; Lovenduski & Norris 2003; Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; Murray 2010; Allen et al. 2015) .
Across the literature, we can find two broad rationales for why someone might wish to support an increase in the number of women in politics.
1 First, you might want to have more women in political office because you believe it will result in the better representation of women's interests, subjectively defined, in the form of what you take to be preferable political outcomes for women. That is, you feel that there is a link between an increase in the DRW and the subsequent SRW. Second, you might support an increase in the DRW in political office because to do so is the just thing to do, regardless of what happens as a result, or because of other anticipated effects not related to the actual representation of women's interests. These effects might include a kind of symbolic representation, or other unintended wider benefits of having more women in office. Anne Phillips neatly summarises this distinction, writing 'I think that the issues we have addressed in recent years under the rubric of representation are not all, or not always, about that. They are often more about inclusion than representation, more about what it means to be recognized as a full member of one's society than how one can effect policy change ' (2012, p.517) . We refer to these different positions as the substantive and justice-plus rationales and briefly summarise them below.
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Writing about those who see a link between DRW and SRW, Celis et al. note that 'the core assumption is that 'numbers matter': an increase in women's descriptive representation in parliaments will generally-even automatically-translate into an increase in SRW ' (2008, p.99) . This idea has informed a substantial body of feminist research into whether or not men and women differ in focus or behaviour once elected to political institutions (Thomas and Welch 1991; Swers 1998; Reingold 2000; Carroll 2001; Childs 2004 ). Contemporary accounts of this possible link between increased DRW and some kind of equivalent increase in SRW have problematized the notion of 'women's interests' itself (Celis et al. 2008; Childs and Krook 2009; Celis and Childs 2012) . In particular, Celis and Childs have noted that the previous approach of academics asking whether such a link between DRW and SRW existed consisted largely of 'counting the number of women present in a particular political institution and judging the actions of women representatives against a 'feminist' shopping list of demands ' (2012, p.213) . As such, the idea that 'women's interests' exist in an objective sense has been brought into question, consequently complicating the link between DRW and SRW.
For our purposes in this paper, though, such academic debates are not so relevant. The popular discourse that surrounds the activities of politicians suggests that the public themselves still strongly believe in a link between the characteristics held by a politician and how they are likely to act. Popular conceptions of the 'political class', for example, rely 2 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for the observation that these categories could apply to any group that is traditionally under-represented in politics, such as ethnic minorities, individuals with disabilities, and LGBT communities.
heavily on the fact that politicians are not descriptively representative of the voters at large in terms of socio-economic class and that this results in some deficit of representation on economic issues (Hacker and Pierson 2011; Carnes 2013; Allen and Cairney 2015) .
Similarly, debates around issues that would be at the heart of any conception of a link between DRW and SRW, such as abortion, have at their core the notion that women will see these issues differently to men (Bicquelet et al. 2012; Penny 2015 What we can more usefully do is turn the argument around, and ask by what 'natural' superiority of talent or experience men could claim a right to dominate assemblies?
The burden of proof then shifts to the men, who would have to establish either some genetic distinction which makes them better at understanding problems and taking decisions, or some more socially derived advantage which enhances their political skills. Neither of these looks particularly persuasive; the first has never been successfully established, and the second is no justification if it depends on structures of discrimination. There is no argument from justice that can defend the current state of affairs; and in this more negative sense, there is an argument from justice for parity between women and men.
Crucially, Phillips' argument is not reliant on what might come about as a result of their being more women in political office. It does not assume that such an increase will result in any particular policies or political outcomes that might benefit women. There are other arguments that equally do not rely on SRW of any kind to justify any increase in DRW. For example, Jane Mansbridge (1999) outlines the ways in which the increased descriptive representation of any social group that has traditionally been politically under-represented might result in various symbolic benefits for members of that group. These include an increased belief in their own ability to rule and participate in politics, as well as the increased legitimation of the political institution in question in the eyes of the traditionally underrepresented group. In other words, women are deemed likely to see a descriptive increase in women in politics as a sign that women as a group do have a role to play in decision-making political institutions, and to see the decisions emanating from those institutions as more legitimate as a result of women's increased presence in them (Mansbridge 1999 ).
Hypotheses
Our interest in this paper is threefold. First, we look to establish overall levels of support for an increase in the descriptive representation of women in political legislatures, and to assess if this differs by sex. A number of studies and surveys of public opinion, predominantly from the United States, suggest that the majority of individuals not only want more women in legislatures (Dolan, 2014, Dolan and Sanbonmatsu, 2009; Sanbonmatsu, 2003; Simmons, 2001) , but that there is a significant difference by sex in terms of support for this idea (Cook, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2003) . Based on this we put forward the following hypothesis: Secondly, as the dominant political group, men themselves are perhaps less likely to have had cause to view politics in terms of their own substantive representation. Rather, they might instead view politics through the lens of a seemingly rationalized partisanship and ideology, thinking about politics as something that is not tied to their own personal gender identity or other characteristics (Sapiro, 1983) . There is some evidence to support this contention, with Robert Johns et al. summarizing this literature as providing 'indirect support for the notion that a social identity account of partisanship is likely to be more accurate for women'. (Johns et al., 2011, p.197 Alternatively, it also seems plausible that no-one has a default belief that members of a social group are better at representing the interests of that social group than anyone else. People might believe, for example, that they themselves are best represented by the content of a political ideology and that this ideology can in turn be represented by anyone regardless of their social characteristics. In such a case, we would expect no sex differences at all. As a result, our fourth and final hypothesis is as follows.
H 3b -Amongst those who believe that there ought to be more women elected to political legislatures, neither men nor women believe that women are better at representing women's interests than men.

Data and Methods
We use 4 An interesting question is whether attitudes vary dependent on the number of women already in office. If cross-national data was available from a range of countries with sufficient variation in this regard, this could be tested using hierarchical models. Sadly, to the best of our knowledge no such data currently exists. 5 We combine the two categories for simplicity. Our later model (multinomial logit) combines these categories out of necessity because of the small sample sizes in some of the categories so we felt that similar categorisations of the dependent variable should be used throughout the paper. However, for brevity, we have modelled the data using an ordinal scale and find no differences in the findings or in the significance of key variables. These results are available on request. Table 1 shows the results of two logistic regression models measuring support for the descriptive representation of women (those who strongly agree and agree with more women
MPs and members of the Northern Ireland Assembly as opposed to those who do not). We run two separate logistic models: the first only includes the sex variable to determine whether there is an identifiable sex effect; the second is the full model containing sex and the predictors outlined above. In this model we determine whether any sex effect holds when other predictors are controlled for. For both models, we report the beta coefficients although the magnitudes of these in logistic models are difficult to interpret. To better assess the relative effect of these variables we convert the statistically significant coefficients into predicted probabilities using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003) . 12 These are also 10 Unionists are predominantly Protestants while Nationalists are overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. There is some overlap but generally this is the case. To avoid any correlation (in excess of 0.7 in our data), we include these political identification variables but not religion. However, as noted above we include church attendance to measure religious activity. 11 Trust in politicians is a dichotomous variable -where don't trust politicians has a value of one and trust is the base category. The statement 'there is discrimination against women in public life' is on a Likert scale where 1 = Strongly disagree and 5 = Strongly agree. This is treated as a continuous variable and it is centered around the grand mean to ease interpretation of the parameter estimates. The models below include an interaction between women and discrimination against women in public life. Centering is applicable here because it reduces any correlation (which was 0.20 and well within acceptable bounds) between the multiplicative term and its component variables. 12 We calculate the probability of supporting the descriptive representation of women when each significant predictor is varied from its minimum to maximum while simultaneously holding continuous predictor variables at their mean values and at zero for dummy variables formed from multiple category variables.
shown in Table 1 . Finally, we report a number of model fit statistics -Log Likelihood and Akaike Information Criterion -at different stages of the modelling process to assess the extent to which the model has improved following the introduction of additional predictors.
Model 1 examines whether public support for an increase in the descriptive representation of women is greater among women than men. The evidence suggests that this is clearly the case, with women 2.9 times more likely to support an increase in DRW than men. The predicted probabilities also suggest that sex has a sizeable impact. To aid interpretation, we multiply the calculated probabilities by 100. The probability among women of supporting descriptive representation for women increases by twenty-four points.
Insert Table 1 But does this sex effect hold when other predictors of descriptive representation are added to the model? The evidence presented in Table 2 suggests that it does, offering descriptive support for H 1 . Not only does the sex variable remain positive and significant but it still exerts a large effect despite the inclusion of additional variables -the probability of support among women for more women in political legislatures increases by seventeen points. Apart from evidence of a sex effect, those individuals that attend church once a month, have secondary level or below education qualifications, who are married, and in the 45-59 age range are all supportive of an increase in the descriptive representation of women. For those individuals that are not in work and stay at home -97.6% of whom are women in this sample -the probability of supporting greater DRW increases by fifteen points. Conversely, those who identify politically as neither Unionist nor Nationalist are less likely to support increases in the descriptive representation for women. Individuals who lack interest in politics exhibit a similar response -among the politically uninterested the probability of support for more women in political legislatures lowers by eight points. Far and away the largest effect on support for an increase in DRW comes from holding the belief that women are discriminated against in public life. Among those who agree that women are discriminated against, the probability of supporting greater DRW increases by sixty points. But women who agreed that women are discriminated against in public life -which we measure using an interaction effect -were not significantly more likely to be supportive of an increase in DRW than men who felt the same way.
Are women who support an increase in DRW more likely to also believe in a link between DRW and SRW than men?
To examine whether women are more likely than men to hold the view that there is a link between DRW and SRW, and descriptively test H 3a , it is necessary to take account of a number of different attitudinal profiles. As stated earlier, we placed individuals into five categories -unsure, anti-and indifferent, supportive of substantive representation but not DRW, and the two rationales of most interest to us, justice-plus and those who both support an increase in descriptive representation of women and believe in a link between DRW and SRW. Insert Table 2 The remaining three groups are of less interest in terms of the focus of the paper but nonetheless exhibit distinctive socio-demographic and political profiles. As might be expected, those who express anti-or indifferent feelings to both the descriptive and substantive representation of women tend to be over-represented among males, those aged 65 and over, retired individuals, those with no qualifications, those who attend church once a month, not working or unemployed (and also in full-time employment), and the working class. We should be wary of the low sample size, but it is clear that these people are more likely to be Unionists and have higher than average distrust of politicians. Like the anti-and indifferent group, those who are unsure also tend to be male, from older age groups and in full time employment. However, this group is over-represented among the middle classes and those with post-secondary qualifications. They tend to be politically interested but are more likely to be Unionist or Nationalist than the wider population. Our data suggests that those individuals who agree that women better represent women's interests but do not support the statement that there ought to be an increase in DRW also has a unique socio-demographic profile. Interestingly, people holding these attitudes tend to be female, in full-time work, middle aged, middle class and highly educated. There is also some over-representation among those who are not working or unemployed, while those that hold this view are more likely to be Nationalist or neither Nationalist nor Unionist and exhibit slightly higher levels of political interest than the wider population.
In summary, individual responses to the two survey statements concerning descriptive and substantive representation can be categorised into five distinct types. Individual members of these categories displayed distinctive socio-economic and political profiles. The descriptive evidence suggests that women rather than men are more likely to hold the view that there is a link between DRW and SRW, offering initial support for H 3a and allowing us to reject H 3b .
Among those advocating the justice-plus rationale, the split is more even between men and women with the former tending to be more over-represented of the two sexes. But is the descriptive evidence of a sex difference borne out when we take account of other predictors?
Modelling justice-plus and substantive rationales
Building on the descriptive evidence presented above, we proceed by specifying a series of multivariate models to more rigorously address our remaining hypotheses (H 2 , H 3a and H 3b ).
Initially, we run a binomial logistic regression to contrast those holding justice-plus rationales against all other categories. Model A of Table 3 reports the results of this logistic regression.
Model B contrasts those who support an increase in DRW and the view that DRW improves SRW with those who are unsure, anti-, and indifferent, and those who are supportive of the idea that DRW and DRW are linked without agreeing that DRW ought to be increased against those holding the justice-plus rationale using a multinomial logistic regression model.
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Looking first at the comparison of those individuals who expressed support for the justiceplus rationale against all other individual attitudes combined (first column in Table 3 , Model A), the results indicate that, as expected, men are significantly more likely to support this position than women (H 2 ). Indeed, being a woman lowers the likelihood of supporting the justice-plus rationale as opposed to alternative attitudes by three points. Apart from evidence of a sex effect, women who agree that women are discriminated in public life are significantly less likely to support descriptive representation for women in isolation -for this group, the probability of advocating a justice-plus rationale reduces by twelve points.
Insert Table 3 Turning to examine support for the remaining attitudinal positions compared against the justice-plus rationale (the other three columns in Table 3 ) leads to clear conclusions that directly address our key hypothesis (H 3a and H 3b ). Relative to other attitudinal positions, amongst those who believe that there ought to be more women elected to political legislatures, women are significantly more likely to hold the belief that women are better at representing women's interests than men. This finding provides unequivocal support for hypothesis (H 3a ). Indeed, being a woman increases the probability of supporting this consequentialist position by a sizeable 21 points (see Figure 1) . Individuals who agree that women are discriminated in public life are also significantly more likely hold a belief in the 13 Here we test for Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) using both the Hausman and Small-Hsiao test -none of the tests reject the H 0 that IIA holds. These findings suggest that a multinomial regression is an appropriate model to address the hypotheses outlined above.
link between descriptive and substantive representation -the probability increases by 60 points and has by far the biggest impact of any variable we include.
Insert Figure 1 When compared against the justice-plus rationale, those who see a link between increased DRW and better SRW were significantly more likely to either have secondary or postsecondary qualifications as opposed to no educational qualifications. They were also found to have an increased likelihood of self-identifying as a Nationalist in the Northern Irish context.
But even when controlling for all these predictors, there is clear evidence of a sex effect.
Turning to the other attitudinal positions, when compared with the justice-plus rationale, there is no evidence of a difference by sex and in all three cases individuals are significantly less likely to agree that women are discriminated in public life. Among those who are antiand indifferent, there is some suggestion that this view is not shared by women (as illustrated by the positive coefficient), but given the small sample size we should be wary of overstating the implications of this finding.
Conclusion
This paper has offered the first attempt in the literature to date to unpack the rationales that might be behind individual-level support for the idea that there ought to be more women present in political institutions. We began by outlining two distinct rationales that might be held regarding any increase in the numbers of women in political institutions -the substantive position that sees an increase in DRW as important in bringing about a subsequent improvement in SRW, or the justice-plus position that sees an increase in DRW as important for reasons of justice or other symbolic benefits. Exploring four key hypotheses, we descriptively found that women are more likely than men to support an increase in DRW, providing evidence for H 1 . Moving to multivariate analyses, we found that women were more likely to hold both the view that an increase in DRW was desirable and that such an increase would improve the representation of women's political interests (SRW). Conversely, men were found to be more likely to support an increase in DRW but not relate DRW to SRW in any way -the justice-plus rationale. This offers support for H 2 and H 3a , respectively, and no support for H 3b which posited that there might be no sex difference in the distribution of these different attitudes.
Our findings have clear implications for those engaged in trying to increase the numbers of women in political institutions. The evidence we present in this paper suggests that men and women think about the under-representation of women in distinct ways. When women agree that there ought to be greater DRW in politics, we can infer that they do so in additional anticipation of the subsequent positive impact this will have on SRW. In other words, women seem to want more women in politics to some extent because they will represent women's interests better than men. On the other hand, men appear to support increases in DRW for reasons unrelated to SRW, reasons we collectively refer to as the justice-plus rationale. There is clear room for future research into the underpinnings of men and women's attitudes towards issues of gender (in)equality and how these should be resolved (Lovenduski 2012) .
Such research should inform those involved in the practicalities of convincing voters that the under-representation of women is something that deserves their attention.
Finally, our results raise normative questions regarding the treatment of those women who do make it into elected political office. If women value an increase in the DRW based on the anticipated benefits this will bring in terms of improved SRW, does this mean that these new women legislators, or prospective women candidates, are being assessed on an extra criterion that their male colleagues are not? As Joni Lovenduski writes, 'the representation of women in political decision making is vital not because it will necessarily make a difference for women, though it often does, but because justice demands it. Equal representation should be taken for granted, part of the institutional fabric. Women should not have to claim political presence on any other basis than justice. To do so puts a special burden of representation on women MPs who become subject to scrutiny and pressure that male politicians largely avoid'
(2012, p.699).
As of yet, it would appear that the public remain to be persuaded on this point. Table 3 where the justice-plus rationale is the base category.
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